Assessing the authorization regime under PSD2: do (different) supervisory practices prevent the achievement of a level playing field in the EU?

31 Pages Posted: 14 Feb 2024

See all articles by Daniel Foa'

Daniel Foa'

Bocconi University

Antonio Davola

ALS: Amsterdam Centre for Transformative Private Law

Date Written: February 14, 2024

Abstract

The research aims at empirically investigating whether a correlation can be identified between the
presence of payment institutions and e-money institutions authorized in each Member State and the restrictiveness of the supervisory practices of individual NCAs. In particular, the analysis is aimed at ascertaining whether the same risks, same rules, same supervision principle can be deemed to be fulfilled within the European payment services sector and - if not - what countermeasures can be taken to reestablish compliance with it.
Building on the data available in the Peer review on authorizations under PSD2 Report published by the EBA, the research inspects the impact of different supervisory policies – together with elements such as the overall “FinTech friendliness” of the considered Member States – on the amount of authorization granted in different Member States, and tries to identify whether the different variables considered are likely to have an impact in terms of potential supervisory arbitrage, henceforth reducing the effectiveness of the harmonization interventions in the Single Market. This will be functional to identify those areas in which procedural harmonization might be advisable, as well as to pinpoint weaknesses in the level playing field model, as it is currently implemented.

Keywords: Payment Services; Authorisation; PSD2; Level playing field; Supervision; National Authorities

JEL Classification: G21; G28; K10; K23

Suggested Citation

Foa', Daniel and Davola, Antonio, Assessing the authorization regime under PSD2: do (different) supervisory practices prevent the achievement of a level playing field in the EU? (February 14, 2024). European Banking Institute Working Paper Series no. 164, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4726086 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4726086

Daniel Foa' (Contact Author)

Bocconi University ( email )

Via Sarfatti, 25
Milan, MI 20136
Italy

Antonio Davola

ALS: Amsterdam Centre for Transformative Private Law ( email )

Spui 21
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

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