The Flipside of Financial Innovation: Why Contracts Fail*

66 Pages Posted: 16 Mar 2024

See all articles by Rajkumar Janardanan

Rajkumar Janardanan

SummerHaven Investment Management

Xiao Qiao

City University of Hong Kong (CityU)

K. Geert Rouwenhorst

Yale School of Management - International Center for Finance

Date Written: July 21, 2024

Abstract

We examine factors that predict the success and failure of financial product innovations using a novel comprehensive database, which contains surviving and defunct commodity futures contracts traded on 36 exchanges between 1871 and 2022. New products are more likely to fail if they do not sufficiently compensate investors for risk, or if they experience extreme returns. Contracts are also less likely to survive if they face significant competitive pressure from other products or exchanges. Finally, innovations fail because they experience systemic shocks to the financial intermediary sector such as wars.

Keywords: Financial Innovation, Futures Markets, Hazard Models, Survival, Commodities, Competition, Risk Premium

JEL Classification: B26,G2,G13,G23,O30

Suggested Citation

Janardanan, Rajkumar and Qiao, Xiao and Rouwenhorst, K. Geert, The Flipside of Financial Innovation: Why Contracts Fail* (July 21, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4730746 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4730746

Rajkumar Janardanan

SummerHaven Investment Management ( email )

Soundview Plaza,
1266 East Main Street
Stamford, CT 06902
United States

Xiao Qiao

City University of Hong Kong (CityU) ( email )

Hong Kong

K. Geert Rouwenhorst (Contact Author)

Yale School of Management - International Center for Finance ( email )

165 Whitney Avenue
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States
203-432-6046 (Phone)
203-432-8931 (Fax)

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