Bankruptcy by Another Name

35 Pages Posted: 8 Mar 2024

See all articles by Anthony Casey

Anthony Casey

University of Chicago Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Joshua Macey

Yale Law School

Date Written: February 19, 2024

Abstract

In a recent Essay, Abbe Gluck, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, and Adam Zimmerman object to the increasing use of bankruptcy to resolve mass tort claims. They and others are concerned that bankruptcy reduces plaintiff voice, impedes the development of state law remedies, and limits discovery that can drive state and federal regulation regulatory interventions. This Online Response Essay addresses these critiques. Contrary to popular descriptions of the bankruptcy system, bankruptcy courts do not simply aim to maximize economic efficiency and financial recoveries. Bankruptcy includes numerous procedures, including robust disclosure, bellwether trials, future claims representatives, and voting, to ensure a fair process and promote non-economic goals. These provisions provide precisely the values that critics argue are missing from the bankruptcy process. And, to the extent that bankruptcy is insufficiently attentive to non-economic values, it is reasonably easy to tweak the system we have to more effectively accommodate these goals.

Suggested Citation

Casey, Anthony and Macey, Joshua, Bankruptcy by Another Name (February 19, 2024). Yale Law Journal, Forthcoming, University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 1014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4730931

Anthony Casey

University of Chicago Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773.702.9578 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/casey

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Joshua Macey (Contact Author)

Yale Law School ( email )

127 Wall Street
New Haven, CT 06510
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://law.yale.edu/joshua-macey

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