Enforcement Priorities in Developing Countries and Economies in Transition: The Priority Setting Paradox
Forthcoming in: T Cheng, J Nowag, D Waked (eds.), Competition Law in Developing Countries, Edward Elgar Publishers, 2024.
Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2024-06
Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance Research Paper No. 2024-03
23 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2024
Date Written: February 20, 2024
Abstract
The power to choose which cases to pursue and which to disregard (“priority setting”), is a crucial precondition for preserving societies’ resources to tackle the most harmful infringements. While such powers are essential to safeguard the quality and effectiveness of competition authorities, both in developed and developing jurisdictions, they are especially critical in light of the common challenges competition authorities in developing countries and economies in transition face. Based on an empirical mapping, this Chapter identifies a priority setting paradox that exists in developing countries: while priority setting is particularly important to authorities in developing countries and economies in transition, many of them have no or very limited powers to set their enforcement targets. This chapter argues that granting such authorities structured and controlled priority setting powers, while preserving valuable accountability mechanisms could remedy some of these challenges.
Keywords: priority setting, competition law, developing countries, administrative discretion, good governance, administrative discretion
JEL Classification: K21, K42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation