Blowing the Whistle

32 Pages Posted: 1 Dec 2003

See all articles by Jose Apesteguia

Jose Apesteguia

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Economics and Business (DEB)

Martin Dufwenberg

University of Arizona - Department of Economics

Reinhard Selten

University of Bonn - Economic Science Area; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: April 28, 2003

Abstract

Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally.

Keywords: Anti-trust, leniency, immunity, amnesty, blow the whistle, cartels, price competition, Bertrand model, experiment, communication

JEL Classification: C92, D43, L13

Suggested Citation

Apesteguia, Jose and Dufwenberg, Martin and Selten, Reinhard, Blowing the Whistle (April 28, 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=473283 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.473283

Jose Apesteguia (Contact Author)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Economics and Business (DEB) ( email )

Barcelona, 08005
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upf.es/~apesteguia/

Martin Dufwenberg

University of Arizona - Department of Economics ( email )

McClelland Hall
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States

Reinhard Selten

University of Bonn - Economic Science Area ( email )

Adenauerallee 24-42
D-53113 Bonn
Germany
++49-228 73-9190 (Phone)
++49-228 73-9193 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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