Corporate Strategy and Information Disclosure

30 Pages Posted: 28 Nov 2003

See all articles by Daniel Ferreira

Daniel Ferreira

London School of Economics - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Marcelo Rezende

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 27, 2006

Abstract

This paper examines voluntary disclosures of information about corporate strategies. We develop a model in which managers choose whether to reveal their strategic plans only to some partners of the firm or also to the outside world. We show that managers face a tradeoff when deciding whether to disclose their private information to outsiders. On the one hand, by disclosing their intentions, managers become reluctant to change their minds in the future. This may lead them to make inefficient project implementation decisions. On the other hand, information disclosure about corporate strategy provides strong incentives for partners of the firm to undertake strategy-specific investments.

Keywords: Corporate Strategy, Disclosure, Commitment, Public Announcements, Managerial Intentions

JEL Classification: M41, M45, J24

Suggested Citation

Ferreira, Daniel and Rezende, Marcelo, Corporate Strategy and Information Disclosure (February 27, 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=473562

Daniel Ferreira (Contact Author)

London School of Economics - Department of Finance ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
(+44) 20 7955 7544 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/FERREIRD/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Marcelo Rezende

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,265
rank
14,821
Abstract Views
5,096
PlumX Metrics
!

Under construction: SSRN citations will be offline until July when we will launch a brand new and improved citations service, check here for more details.

For more information