Post Post-Paramount Decrees: The Evolution of Antitrust Concerns as the Film Industry Transforms

36 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2024

See all articles by Rachel Shoemaker

Rachel Shoemaker

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Date Written: February 22, 2024

Abstract

In 1948, a decade-long antitrust investigation into the leading film studios resulted in the Paramount Decrees, a consent decree that shattered the studio cartel and changed Hollywood forever – but after seventy years of evolution in the film industry and antitrust law, the Department of Justice determined that the Paramount Decrees were no longer necessary, with the federal court striking down the Decrees in 2020. A lot has changed since the Decrees were enacted and continues to change after they have ended, with new developments in the industry sparking some concern that studios may return to the anticompetitive activity of the past. Changes in antitrust laws, the unprecedented growth of streaming, and the post-pandemic fall and potential Barbenheimer rise of theaters have drastically changed the landscape of exhibition not only since 1948 but even after 2020. Only time will tell whether studios will take a full-fledged dive back into their anticompetitive conduct of the past, but new developments in the industry show some cause for concern for consumer welfare. Still, the ultra-competitive market and threat of antitrust enforcement that have kept non-decree-defendant studios in check for decades will likely prevent the industry-wide competitive activity that was rampant in the Golden Age of Hollywood.

Suggested Citation

Shoemaker, Rachel, Post Post-Paramount Decrees: The Evolution of Antitrust Concerns as the Film Industry Transforms (February 22, 2024). UCLA Entertainment Law Review, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4735835 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4735835

Rachel Shoemaker (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

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