Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Hostile Bids Regime in Europe, 2004-2023

29 Pages Posted: 26 Feb 2024 Last revised: 6 Mar 2024

See all articles by Luca Enriques

Luca Enriques

University of Oxford Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Matteo Gatti

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey - Rutgers Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: February 1, 2024

Abstract

The E.U. Takeover Directive was passed twenty years ago with the main aim of fostering a single European takeover market. However, subsequent economic, political, legal, and corporate governance developments have hindered the Directive’s goal of enhancing the European market for corporate control. This paper outlines the pro-market climate surrounding the Directive’s inception, traces the subsequent changes in market dynamics and governance, and examines the legislative measures that have contributed to the current state of the market for corporate control in Europe. Despite the continued existence of hostile bids, their importance and impact has shrunk under the current environment. This trend has reduced firm dynamism and resulted in benefits for a select few (notably, corporate insiders and national politicians).

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Corporate Law, Market for Corporate Control, European Takeover Bids Directive, Hostile Takeovers, Mergers and Acquisitions, Takeover Defenses

JEL Classification: D21, G30, G32, G34, G38, K22

Suggested Citation

Enriques, Luca and Gatti, Matteo, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Hostile Bids Regime in Europe, 2004-2023 (February 1, 2024). European Corporate Governance Institute - Law Working Paper No. 755/2024, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4738087 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4738087

Luca Enriques (Contact Author)

University of Oxford Faculty of Law ( email )

St Cross Building
St Cross Road
Oxford, OX1 3UL
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://http:/www.ecgi.org

Matteo Gatti

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey - Rutgers Law School ( email )

Newark, NJ
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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