Global Spillovers of Taxation in the Online Advertising Market. Theory and Evidence from Facebook

73 Pages Posted: 26 Feb 2024

See all articles by Andrea Lassmann

Andrea Lassmann

Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz

Federica Liberini

Queen Mary University of London

Antonio Russo

University of Sheffield

Ángel Cuevas

Charles III University of Madrid

Ruben Cuevas

Charles III University of Madrid

Abstract

We study the effect of corporate taxes on multinational digital platforms and the online global advertising market. Using a novel dataset of advertising prices and user product preferences from Facebook, that we combine with international trade data, we show that an increase in the platform’s corporate tax rate in several countries had a sizeable effect on advertising prices therein. Given the platform’s two-sided and multinational structure, we also document substantial spillovers in the effects of ad prices across countries. The results are consistent with our theoretical model, which shows that, due to consumers’ limited tolerance for ads, the platform reduces the supply of ads to advertisers located in countries where it faces a higher tax rate.

Keywords: Online advertising, Two-sided Platforms, corporate taxes, Pass-through, international trade

Suggested Citation

Lassmann, Andrea and Liberini, Federica and Russo, Antonio and Cuevas, Ángel and Cuevas, Ruben, Global Spillovers of Taxation in the Online Advertising Market. Theory and Evidence from Facebook. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4739236 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4739236

Andrea Lassmann (Contact Author)

Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz ( email )

Saarstr. 21
Jakob Welder-Weg 4
Mainz, 55122
Germany

Federica Liberini

Queen Mary University of London ( email )

Mile End Road
London, E1 4NS
United Kingdom

Antonio Russo

University of Sheffield ( email )

17 Mappin Street
Sheffield, Sheffield S1 4DT
United Kingdom

Ángel Cuevas

Charles III University of Madrid ( email )

CL. de Madrid 126
Madrid, Madrid 28903
Spain

Ruben Cuevas

Charles III University of Madrid ( email )

CL. de Madrid 126
Madrid, Madrid 28903
Spain

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
22
Abstract Views
126
PlumX Metrics