The Re-Monopolization of the U.S. Sports Trading Card Industry

51 Pages Posted: 29 Feb 2024 Last revised: 21 Feb 2025

See all articles by Marc Edelman

Marc Edelman

City University of New York - Baruch College, Zicklin School of Business; Fordham University School of Law

Nathaniel Grow

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Law

John T. Holden

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Law

Date Written: February 26, 2024

Abstract

The collecting of sports trading cards was once thought of as an outdated childhood hobby. During the COVID pandemic, however, the sports trading card industry experienced a resurgence of popularity—capitalizing on the same growing societal interest in collectables and alternative investments that catapulted companies selling non-fungible tokens (NFTs) and cryptocurrencies into prominence. Thanks to this newfound interest in card collecting, sports trading cards are now estimated to comprise an $8 billion industry. This growth has also led one company, Fanatics, to try to gain control of the hobby through a series of allegedly anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions.

Long known as a leading retailer of licensed apparel, Fanatics began its unexpected move into sports trading cards in 2021 by procuring the long-term exclusive rights to produce sports trading cards for the National Football League, National Basketball Association, and Major League Baseball. Since then, Fanatics has gone on to acquire one of the industry’s best-known competitors (Topps), while also asserting control over much of the rest of the vertical supply chain necessary for manufacturing sports trading cards. Fanatics’ consolidation of the industry thus harkens back to an earlier era, when Topps itself enjoyed a nearly 25-year, uninterrupted monopoly over sports trading cards, a period that featured increasingly uninspired product offerings for consumers.

In August 2023, displaced rival sports trading card company Panini sued Fanatics, arguing that Fanatics’s tactics violated federal antitrust law by excluding Panini from the trading card business. Even beyond the scope of this lawsuit, however, the consolidation of the U.S. sports trading card industry raises a host of other important questions regarding the legality of the complex series of exclusive licensing agreements with sports teams and players’ unions upon which Fanatics’s consolidation depends.

This Article analyzes the implications of Fanatics’s re-monopolization of the sports trading card industry, as well as the potential effects that its exclusive sports-licensing agreements have on consumers more broadly. It concludes by expressing concern about the reconsolidation of the U.S. sports trading card industry, and encourages courts to conduct a long-overdue reconsideration of sports leagues’ exclusive trademark licensing practices.

Keywords: Antitrust, intellectual property, sports law, group licensing, right of publicity, sports cards, Fanatics, Topps, Panini

JEL Classification: K21

Suggested Citation

Edelman, Marc and Grow, Nathaniel and Holden, John, The Re-Monopolization of the U.S. Sports Trading Card Industry (February 26, 2024). 2025 Univ. of Illinois Law Review 63 (2025), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4739580

Marc Edelman

City University of New York - Baruch College, Zicklin School of Business ( email )

One Bernard Baruch Way
Box B9-220
New York, NY 10010
United States

Fordham University School of Law ( email )

140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States

Nathaniel Grow (Contact Author)

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Law ( email )

Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

John Holden

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Law ( email )

Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

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