Information Acquisition in Deliberative Democracies

47 Pages Posted: 30 Mar 2024 Last revised: 14 Nov 2024

See all articles by Gerard Domènech-Gironell

Gerard Domènech-Gironell

University of Padova, Department of Economics and Management

Oriol Tejada

University of Barcelona

Caio Lorecchio

University of Barcelona - Barcelona Economic Analysis Team (BEAT)

Date Written: March 1, 2024

Abstract

We examine the impact of deliberation on political learning and election outcomes. We model a rational, common-valued electorate voting between two alternatives under majority rule, after potentially acquiring costly private information and sharing it freely through public deliberation. Deliberation can lead to free-riding on information gathering and encourage the emergence of informed political experts. But deliberation may also legitimize purely electoral outcomes---we provide conditions under which the same equilibrium without deliberation can be an equilibrium with deliberation---and may yield more accurate decisions. However, deliberation may also reduce electoral accuracy. Our results contribute to the understanding of the strengths and limitations of deliberative democracies, both from a normative and a positive perspective.

Keywords: elections, information acquisition, communication

JEL Classification: D72, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Domènech-Gironell, Gerard and Tejada, Oriol and Lorecchio, Caio, Information Acquisition in Deliberative Democracies (March 1, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4744447 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4744447

Gerard Domènech-Gironell (Contact Author)

University of Padova, Department of Economics and Management ( email )

Via del Santo 33
Padova, Padova 35123
Italy

Oriol Tejada

University of Barcelona ( email )

Gran Via de les Corts Catalanes, 585
Barcelona, 08007
Spain

Caio Lorecchio

University of Barcelona - Barcelona Economic Analysis Team (BEAT) ( email )

Gran Via de les Corts Catalanes
Barcelona, 08007
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://caiolorecchio.com

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
50
Abstract Views
207
PlumX Metrics