Information Acquisition, Networks and Voting

39 Pages Posted: 30 Mar 2024

See all articles by Gerard Domènech-Gironell

Gerard Domènech-Gironell

University of Cyprus

Oriol Tejada

University of Barcelona

Caio Lorecchio

University of Barcelona - Barcelona Economic Analysis Team (BEAT)

Date Written: March 1, 2024

Abstract

A society of identical individuals must choose through elections one of two alternatives under uncertainty about the state of the world. Individuals can (a) choose the accuracy of their private signals about the state of the world at an increasing cost, and (b) send messages to other individuals to whom they are connected in some network. We show that the existence of a full network leads generically to two types of equilibria. First, there always exists an equilibrium in which only one citizen—a dictator—acquires information and everybody else votes equally based on such information, which is sent by the dictator to all other citizens via the network. Second, the only symmetric equilibrium that would exist without a network is also an equilibrium with a full network, but only if information acquisition costs are sufficiently high. This condition keeps at bay the extent of the positive externalities created by acquiring information that can be distributed at no cost.

Keywords: elections, information acquisition, communication

JEL Classification: D72, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Domènech-Gironell, Gerard and Tejada, Oriol and Lorecchio, Caio, Information Acquisition, Networks and Voting (March 1, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4744447 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4744447

Gerard Domènech-Gironell (Contact Author)

University of Cyprus ( email )

75 Kallipoleos Street
Nicosia CY 1678, Nicosia P.O. Box 2
Cyprus

Oriol Tejada

University of Barcelona ( email )

Gran Via de les Corts Catalanes, 585
Barcelona, 08007
Spain

Caio Lorecchio

University of Barcelona - Barcelona Economic Analysis Team (BEAT) ( email )

Gran Via de les Corts Catalanes
Barcelona, 08007
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://caiolorecchio.com

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