A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Corporate Lobbying in the European Parliament

European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Vol. 7, No. 11, 2003

20 Pages Posted: 5 Dec 2003

See all articles by Pieter Bouwen

Pieter Bouwen

Catholic University of Leuven (UCL) - Department of Political Science and International Relations

Abstract

This paper is an attempt to empirically test a theory of access that investigates the logic behind the apparent ad hoc lobbying behavior of business interests in the European Parliament. The theoretical framework tries to explain the degree of access of different organizational forms of business interest representation (companies, associations and consultants) to the European Parliament in terms of a theory of the supply and demand of "access goods". The generated hypotheses are analyzed in an empirical study of the EU financial services sector. On the basis of 14 exploratory and 27 semi-structured interviews the hypotheses are checked in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament.

Keywords: interest intermediation, interest representation, lobbying, participation, MEPs, European Parliament, political science, sociology, EIoP

Suggested Citation

Bouwen, Pieter, A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Corporate Lobbying in the European Parliament. European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Vol. 7, No. 11, 2003, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=474923 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.474923

Pieter Bouwen (Contact Author)

Catholic University of Leuven (UCL) - Department of Political Science and International Relations ( email )

Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

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