The End of Average: Deploying Agent-Based Modeling to Antitrust

Amsterdam Law & Technology Institute Working Paper Series 2024

VU University Amsterdam Legal Studies Paper Series Forthcoming

48 Pages Posted: 9 Mar 2024

See all articles by Thibault Schrepel

Thibault Schrepel

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Stanford University's Codex Center; University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne; Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po)

John Schuler

The George B. Delaplaine Jr. School of Business, Hood College; Kukun Home Investment Intelligence

Date Written: March 3, 2024

Abstract

Antitrust law and policy rely on a hypothetical average consumer. But no one is average. With this basic observation in mind, we show how agent-based modeling (“ABM”) allows enforcers and policymakers to bypass imaginary averages by observing interactions between unique agents. We argue that agent-based regulatory and enforcement policies have a greater potential than average-based public policies because they are more realistic. As we show, the realism brought by ABM enables antitrust agencies and policymakers to better anticipate the effects of their actions and, perhaps more importantly, to time their interventions better.

Keywords: antitrust, monopoly, complex systems, agent-based modeling

JEL Classification: L12, L40, K21, B5, D21, D85, E14, K20, L40, L41, L43, L50, L51, K24, B52

Suggested Citation

Schrepel, Thibault and Schuler, John, The End of Average: Deploying Agent-Based Modeling to Antitrust (March 3, 2024). Amsterdam Law & Technology Institute Working Paper Series 2024, VU University Amsterdam Legal Studies Paper Series Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4752578

Thibault Schrepel (Contact Author)

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
Netherlands

Stanford University's Codex Center ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne ( email )

France

Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po) ( email )

27 rue Saint-Guillaume
Paris Cedex 07, 75337
France

John Schuler

The George B. Delaplaine Jr. School of Business, Hood College ( email )

401 Rosemont Ave
Frederick, MD 21701
5613717294 (Phone)

Kukun Home Investment Intelligence ( email )

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