European Banks Are Not Immune to National Elections

28 Pages Posted: 8 Mar 2024

See all articles by Zuzana Fungáčová

Zuzana Fungáčová

Bank of Finland - Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT)

Eeva Kerola

Bank of Finland

Laurent Weill

University of Strasbourg - LaRGE Research Center (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie)

Date Written: February 29, 2024

Abstract

We investigate whether European banks adjust their loan prices and volumes of new lending in the months running up to major national elections. Using a unique dataset that draws on data covering some 250 banks in 19 Eurozone countries from 2010 to 2020 at monthly frequency, and that includes lending amounts and interest rates on new lending, we find that European banks increase loan rates for corporate and housing loans ahead of elections. This supports the view that loan pricing changes of European banks are driven by the electoral uncertainty inherent to the democratic election process. We find that the impact of elections is more pronounced for small banks, as well as obtain some evidence that elections affect the credit supply of banks. Our findings suggest that the occurrence of elections is affecting the behavior of European banks.

Keywords: bank, lending, politics, elections, political uncertainty, loan pricing

JEL Classification: C51, E37, E44, F34

Suggested Citation

Fungacova, Zuzana and Kerola, Eeva and Weill, Laurent, European Banks Are Not Immune to National Elections (February 29, 2024). BOFIT Discussion Paper No. 4/2024, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4752818 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4752818

Zuzana Fungacova (Contact Author)

Bank of Finland - Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT) ( email )

Snellmaninaukio
PO Box 160
Helsinki 00101
Finland

HOME PAGE: http://www.bof.fi/bofit_en/index.htm

Eeva Kerola

Bank of Finland ( email )

P.O. Box 160
Helsinki 00101
Finland

Laurent Weill

University of Strasbourg - LaRGE Research Center (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie) ( email )

61 Avenue de la Forêt Noire
F-67085 Strasbourg Cedex
France

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