Employment and Wage Bargaining in an Open Monetary Union

REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

Posted: 21 Mar 1997

See all articles by Pierre Cahuc

Pierre Cahuc

National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - National School for Statistical and Economic Administration (ENSAE); Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative (EUREQUA); University of Angers - French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Hubert Kempf

Ecole Normale Superieure de Cachan (ENS)

Abstract

This paper studies the incidence of alternative patterns of wage bargaining in an open two-country monetary Union. Wages are fixed by trade-unions for two periods, either at the national or the monetary Union level. It is shown that the best solution regarding unemployment depends on the nature of externalities and dynamic strategic interactions between the monetary Union's countries, namely on the openness degree of the monetary Union and the differentiation index between national goods.

JEL Classification: F41, J5

Suggested Citation

Cahuc, Pierre and Kempf, Hubert, Employment and Wage Bargaining in an Open Monetary Union. REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4756

Pierre Cahuc (Contact Author)

National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - National School for Statistical and Economic Administration (ENSAE) ( email )

92245 Malakoff Cedex
France

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative (EUREQUA) ( email )

106-112 Boulevard de l'Hopital
Paris Cedex 13, 75647
France
+33 1 4117 3717 (Phone)
+33 1 4117 3724 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://eurequa.univ-paris1.fr/membres/cahuc/

University of Angers - French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)

106-112 Boulevard de l'Hopital
75647 Paris Cedex 13
France
+33 4 44 07 82 06 (Phone)
+33 4 44 07 82 02 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Hubert Kempf

Ecole Normale Superieure de Cachan (ENS) ( email )

61 avenue du président Wilson
Cachan, Paris 94235
France

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