Shifting Volumes to the Close: Consequences for Price Discovery and Market Quality

39 Pages Posted: 13 Mar 2024 Last revised: 20 Mar 2024

See all articles by Micha Bender

Micha Bender

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Benjamin Clapham

Goethe University Frankfurt Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Benedikt Schwemmlein

Deutsche Bundesbank

Abstract

Due to the rise in passive investments and regulatory changes, equity markets worldwide have witnessed substantial shifts of trading volumes to the close. Based on three major European markets, where closing auctions account for more than one third of daily trading volume, we analyze whether such high-volume closing auctions have negative implications for price discovery at the close and market quality during continuous trading. We find evidence for significant distortions of the closing price with 14% of the closing auction return being systematically reversed overnight. Increasing closing auction volumes, index rebalancing days, and high intraday returns are the main drivers of these reversals. Our results also show that intraday liquidity decreases due to the shift of trading volumes to the close while volatility improves. Thus, our findings on the effects of high-volume closing auctions are in contrast to the positive effects of closing auctions for price discovery and liquidity predicted by theory.

Keywords: Closing Auction, Passive Investing, Price Efficiency, Liquidity, volatility

Suggested Citation

Bender, Micha and Clapham, Benjamin and Schwemmlein, Benedikt, Shifting Volumes to the Close: Consequences for Price Discovery and Market Quality. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4757345 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4757345

Micha Bender

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 4
Frankfurt am Main, D-60323
Germany

Benjamin Clapham (Contact Author)

Goethe University Frankfurt Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 4
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Benedikt Schwemmlein

Deutsche Bundesbank ( email )

Wilhelm-Epstein-Str. 14
Frankfurt/Main, 60431
Germany

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