How Do Managerial Entrenchment and Expropriation Affect Control Mechanisms?
30 Pages Posted: 28 Feb 2004
Date Written: December 4, 2003
Abstract
This paper proposes a new empirical approach that allows us to appropriately control for the non-linearities of ownership with respect to firm value when analysing how managerial entrenchment and expropriation affect the relations among control mechanisms. Unlike findings in previous US-based studies, which in general point to substitutability among mechanisms, our results show that control mechanisms (especially insider ownership, debt and dividends) are used in a complementary way by Spanish firms. In addition, this complementarity is only observed when the interests of managers and owners converge, but not when there are controlling owners - insiders or outsiders - whose interests need not coincide with those of minority shareholders. Therefore, managerial entrenchment and expropriation effects do influence the relationship among agency-cost control mechanisms.
Keywords: ownership concentration, insider ownership, debt, dividends, entrenchment , expropriation
JEL Classification: G32
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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