Implications of Information and Social Interactions for Retirement Saving Decisions

PRC Working Paper No. 2003-13

Posted: 7 Dec 2003

See all articles by Esther Duflo

Esther Duflo

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development (BREAD)

Date Written: 2003

Abstract

This chapter summarizes key findings from experimental or quasi-experimental studies on the determinants of savings through employer-sponsored retirement benefits plans. Research shows that default rules and the ability to commit now for the future can have a dramatic impact on enrollment rates. Analysis also shows that enrollment decisions can be influenced by peer decisions, as well as information provided by the employer. We also identify gaps in existing knowledge and propose new randomized experiments which could be conducted in the workplace, that would fill important gaps in our understanding of the determinants of retirement savings.

Suggested Citation

Duflo, Esther, Implications of Information and Social Interactions for Retirement Saving Decisions (2003). PRC Working Paper No. 2003-13. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=476026

Esther Duflo (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

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Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) ( email )

Cambridge, MA
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.povertyactionlab.org/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development (BREAD) ( email )

Duke University
Durham, NC 90097
United States

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