A New Lease on Firm Behavior

81 Pages Posted: 23 Mar 2024 Last revised: 6 Feb 2025

See all articles by Matteo Binfarè

Matteo Binfarè

University of Missouri at Columbia - Department of Finance

Crocker Herbert Liu

Cornell University - School of Hotel Administration

Fotis Grigoris

University of Iowa

Robert Connolly

University of Florida

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 12, 2020

Abstract

When firms have discretion in valuing their balance sheet debt, how do they make this valuation decision given its impact on firm value? Firms make extensive use of operating leases, but unlike other types of debt, their balance sheet value is set by the firm. Using novel information on operating leases, we examine firm behavior in valuing these leases. We find that 20% of firms report higher-than-expected rates, reflecting their cost of unsecured rather than collateralized borrowing. These firms have poor information quality, operate in competitive markets, and understate lease and debt ratios by 15%.

Keywords: ASC 842, Capital Structure, Discount Rate, Lease, Secured Debt

undefined

Suggested Citation

Binfarè, Matteo and Liu, Crocker Herbert and Grigoris, Fotis and Connolly, Robert, A New Lease on Firm Behavior (August 12, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4770593 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4770593

Matteo Binfarè (Contact Author)

University of Missouri at Columbia - Department of Finance ( email )

Robert J. Trulaske, Sr. College of Business
403 Cornell Hall
Columbia, MO 65211
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.matteobinfare.com

Crocker Herbert Liu

Cornell University - School of Hotel Administration ( email )

435B Statler Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853-6902
United States

Fotis Grigoris

University of Iowa ( email )

341 Schaeffer Hall
Iowa City, IA 52242-1097
United States

Robert Connolly

University of Florida ( email )

PO Box 117165, 201 Stuzin Hall
Gainesville, FL 32610-0496
United States

0 References

    0 Citations

      Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

      Paper statistics

      Downloads
      74
      Abstract Views
      331
      Rank
      95,749
      PlumX Metrics