When Protectionism Kills Talent

Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2024-03-007

Charles A. Dice Center Working Paper No. 2024-07

101 Pages Posted: 27 Mar 2024 Last revised: 7 Jan 2025

See all articles by Mehmet Canayaz

Mehmet Canayaz

Pennsylvania State University - Smeal College of Business

Isil Erel

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Umit G. Gurun

University of Texas at Dallas

Yufeng Wu

Ohio State University (OSU)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 03, 2024

Abstract

Protectionist policies intended to revitalize US chip manufacturing backfired, ultimately weakening the domestic workforce they aimed to rebuild. Instead of fostering talent growth, these measures resulted in a significant decline in hiring for critical science and engineering roles, particularly in entry-level positions and at firms heavily impacted by tariffs. Companies heavily reliant on foreign talent cut back on domestic recruitment and instead shifted to hiring in countries with more favorable immigration policies. US protectionism also discouraged students from pursuing chip-related degrees, leading to a contraction in the domestic talent pipeline. Our conceptual model, which demonstrates how labor supply constraints and rising costs undermine the effectiveness of protectionism, provides a theoretical foundation for these findings.

Keywords: Economic nationalism, Chip, Tariff, Career, Semiconductor, H1-B, Labor

JEL Classification: F16, J21, J23, O3, L1, G15

Suggested Citation

Canayaz, Mehmet and Erel, Isil and Gurun, Umit G. and Wu, Yufeng, When Protectionism Kills Talent (October 03, 2024). Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2024-03-007, Charles A. Dice Center Working Paper No. 2024-07, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4773403 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4773403

Mehmet Canayaz (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University - Smeal College of Business ( email )

University Park, PA 16802
United States

Isil Erel

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance ( email )

2100 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210-1144
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Umit G. Gurun

University of Texas at Dallas ( email )

2601 North Floyd Road
Richardson, TX 75083
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.umitgurun.com

Yufeng Wu

Ohio State University (OSU) ( email )

812 Fisher Hall
2100 Neil Ave
Columbus, OH 43210
United States
43210 (Fax)

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