Geographic Shareholder Dispersion and Mutual Fund Flow Risk

42 Pages Posted: 28 Mar 2024 Last revised: 19 Apr 2024

See all articles by Javier Gil-Bazo

Javier Gil-Bazo

Universitat Pompeu Fabra; UPF Barcelona School of Management; Barcelona School of Economics

Raffaele Santioni

Bank of Italy

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 26, 2024

Abstract

Exploiting the Securities Holdings Statistics from the Eurosystem, we study the relation between shareholder country concentration and flow risk for euro area mutual funds. We find that funds with a more geographically dispersed investor base experience more volatile flows. The link between shareholder country concentration and flow risk is a widespread phenomenon: It holds for funds investing in different asset classes and in different regions. However, we find no difference in net performance between funds with more and less concentrated shareholders, which suggests that any potential costs of investors' geographic dispersion are offset by either enhanced liquidity management or superior performance. Additional tests reveal that investors in funds with higher geographic shareholder dispersion are more sensitive to fund performance, consistently with a clientele effect driving our findings. Finally, we show that the positive association between geographic investor dispersion and flow risk holds for different measures of flow risk and is not driven by institutional investors, non-euro area investors, or the COVID-19 episode.

Keywords: Geographic shareholder dispersion, mutual-fund flow risk, mutual fund fragility, cross-border funds.

JEL Classification: G23, G11, G17

Suggested Citation

Gil-Bazo, Javier and Santioni, Raffaele, Geographic Shareholder Dispersion and Mutual Fund Flow Risk (March 26, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4773924 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4773924

Javier Gil-Bazo (Contact Author)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

UPF Barcelona School of Management ( email )

Carrer de Balmes, 132, 134
Barcelona, 08008
Spain

Barcelona School of Economics ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Raffaele Santioni

Bank of Italy ( email )

Via Nazionale 91
Rome, 00184
Italy

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