Conventions and social choice in large games
41 Pages Posted: 15 Apr 2024
Date Written: March 28, 2024
Abstract
By showing that a one-shot deviation property holds for almost all large games in which a convention (in the sense of Young, 1993) exists, social choice rules are characterized as long-run outcomes under behavioral rules.
Keywords: evolution, stability, one-shot, social choice
JEL Classification: C71, C73, D01
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Newton, Jonathan and Sawa, Ryoji, Conventions and social choice in large games (March 28, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4775575 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4775575
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