Conventions and social choice in large games

41 Pages Posted: 15 Apr 2024

See all articles by Jonathan Newton

Jonathan Newton

Kyoto University - Institute of Economic Research

Ryoji Sawa

University of Tsukuba

Date Written: March 28, 2024

Abstract

By showing that a one-shot deviation property holds for almost all large games in which a convention (in the sense of Young, 1993) exists, social choice rules are characterized as long-run outcomes under behavioral rules.

Keywords: evolution, stability, one-shot, social choice

JEL Classification: C71, C73, D01

Suggested Citation

Newton, Jonathan and Sawa, Ryoji, Conventions and social choice in large games (March 28, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4775575 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4775575

Jonathan Newton (Contact Author)

Kyoto University - Institute of Economic Research ( email )

Yoshida-Honmachi
Sakyo-ku
Kyoto 606-8501
JAPAN

Ryoji Sawa

University of Tsukuba ( email )

Japan

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
100
Abstract Views
339
Rank
547,074
PlumX Metrics