Monotonicity in Ultimatum Bargaining

40 Pages Posted: 28 Mar 2024

See all articles by Jack Robles

Jack Robles

Victoria University of Wellington - Te Herenga Waka - School of Economics & Finance

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Abstract

We study ultimatum bargaining games with asymmetric information regarding disagreement payoffs. Results from Mensch (2020) are used to find conditions under which a monotonic Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium exists in these games. A standard single crossing assumption implies the existence when the action space is discrete. Stronger assumptions are required when continuum demands are allowed. JEL Classification Numbers: C62, C72, C78, D82

Keywords: Games of Incomplete Information, Dynamic Bayesian Games, Pure Strategy, Single Crossing Property, Bargaining, Ultimatum Game

Suggested Citation

Robles, Jack, Monotonicity in Ultimatum Bargaining. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4776603 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4776603

Jack Robles (Contact Author)

Victoria University of Wellington - Te Herenga Waka - School of Economics & Finance ( email )

P.O. Box 600
Wellington 6001
New Zealand

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