Taxes, Profit Shifting, and the Real Activities of MNEs: Evidence from Corporate Tax Notches

53 Pages Posted: 15 Apr 2024

See all articles by Jaqueline Hansen

Jaqueline Hansen

University of Tübingen

Valeria Merlo

University of Tuebingen

Georg Wamser

University of Tübingen

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 29, 2024

Abstract

We exploit exogenous variation in tax notches created by controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules to better understand the profit-shifting behavior of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and its consequences for real activity. Using new data on CFC rules and information on direct parent-affiliate ownership links, our identification approach allows us to estimate an unbiased profit-shifting semi-elasticity of about 0.22. Removing incentives to shift profits to particular low-tax locations leads to profit relocation to 'next-best' low-tax countries, allowing firms to circumvent domestic taxation. We do not find any significant effects on parent shareholders, neither in terms of repatriated profit nor in terms of their real economic activity. Other entities within the MNE, where profits get relocated to, see a significant increase in various measures of real activity.

Keywords: corporate taxation, profit shifting, anti-tax-avoidance rules, multinational enterprise, firm organization

JEL Classification: F23, H25

Suggested Citation

Hansen, Jaqueline and Merlo, Valeria and Wamser, Georg, Taxes, Profit Shifting, and the Real Activities of MNEs: Evidence from Corporate Tax Notches (March 29, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4778031 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4778031

Jaqueline Hansen

University of Tübingen ( email )

Wilhelmstr. 19
72074 Tuebingen, Baden Wuerttemberg 72074
Germany

Valeria Merlo

University of Tuebingen ( email )

Department of Economics
Nauklerstr. 47
Tübingen, 72074
Germany

Georg Wamser (Contact Author)

University of Tübingen ( email )

Mohlstr. 36
72074 Tuebingen, Baden Wuerttemberg 72074
Germany

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