Between Boardrooms and the Beltway: The Career Paths of Senior Regulators

70 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2024

See all articles by Ran Duchin

Ran Duchin

Boston College - Carroll School of Management

Jeffery (Yudong) Wang

Boston College - Carroll School of Management

Date Written: April 7, 2024

Abstract

We compile a comprehensive database of senior federal regulators and trace their full career paths since college graduation across the private and public sectors. We find that revolving-door moves across the private and public sectors are ubiquitous, persistent, correlated with economic and election cycles, and typically occur several times over the course of one’s career. Revolving-door regulators exhibit more regulatory (but not deregulatory) activity, stricter enforcement, and higher regulation complexity. Further, they work for stronger firms, come from relatively poorer backgrounds, and accumulate more wealth throughout their careers. Overall, we quantify regulators’ incentives to build financial, bureaucratic, and human capital.

Keywords: Regulators, Executive Branch, Revolving-door, Career Concerns

JEL Classification: G30, G28, G38

Suggested Citation

Duchin, Ran and Wang, Jeffery (Yudong), Between Boardrooms and the Beltway: The Career Paths of Senior Regulators (April 7, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4787091 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4787091

Ran Duchin (Contact Author)

Boston College - Carroll School of Management ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

Jeffery (Yudong) Wang

Boston College - Carroll School of Management ( email )

Carroll School of Management
140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467-3808
United States

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