All Show and No Know? The Effects of Outcome Transparency and Learning Path Personalization on Employees’ Investments in Learning

58 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2024

See all articles by Eddy Cardinaels

Eddy Cardinaels

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management; KU Leuven

Willie Choi

University of Wisconsin - Madison

Qinnan Ruan

VU University Amsterdam; Tilburg University

Date Written: January 1, 2024

Abstract

Although firms implement employee learning programs to benefit from employees’ improved knowledge, such benefits fail to materialize when employees fail to invest in their own learning and use ineffective learning strategies. Using an experiment, we examine the effects of two features of employee learning programs frequently discussed as ways to motivate learning or to discourage ineffective learning: outcome transparency and learning path personalization. We predict and find outcome transparency increases the propensity to use ineffective learning strategies. Further, we predict and find a personalized learning path that provides employees the ability to direct their own learning decreases the propensity to use ineffective learning strategies, thereby offsetting the negative effects of outcome transparency. Our results contribute to a better understanding of how firms can design their employee learning programs by highlighting the costs of outcome transparency and the myriad benefits of a personalized learning path.

Keywords: Employee learning, outcome transparency, learning path personalization, performance and mastery orientation, employee curiosity

JEL Classification: M41, M40, M53

Suggested Citation

Cardinaels, Eddy and Choi, Jongwoon and Ruan, Qinnan, All Show and No Know? The Effects of Outcome Transparency and Learning Path Personalization on Employees’ Investments in Learning (January 1, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4788456 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4788456

Eddy Cardinaels

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 134668231 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/webwijs/show/?uid=e.cardinaels

KU Leuven ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium
+32 16326984 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.kuleuven.be/wieiswie/nl/person/00013472

Jongwoon Choi

University of Wisconsin - Madison ( email )

Wisconsin School of Business
975 University Avenue
Madison, WI 53706
United States

Qinnan Ruan (Contact Author)

VU University Amsterdam ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam, ND North Holland 1081 HV
Netherlands

Tilburg University ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC Noord-Brabant 5000 LE
Netherlands

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