Exploiting Social Funds’ Desire for Impact through Imprecise Financial Climate-Risk Information

51 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2024

See all articles by Volker Laux

Volker Laux

University of Texas at Austin; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Lucas Mahieux

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management

Date Written: September 03, 2024

Abstract

Socially responsible funds that wish to make an impact subsidize firms to induce the adoption of cleaner products and technologies. We show that firms can exploit a social fund's desire for impact by measuring their financial climate risk exposure imprecisely. Relative to precise measurement, imprecise measurement of the firm's climate risk gives the social fund more room for impact, which increases the amount of subsidies the firm can extract. A by-product of imprecise measurement is that the firm and the social fund may invest in clean business strategies more frequently than what would be bilaterally efficient under precise measurement. Our model suggests that the current regulatory push for more precise financial climate-risk information can reduce the social fund's ability to make an impact and the firm's incentive to adopt clean business strategies.

Keywords: information design, climate-risk measurement, socially responsible investing, ESG reporting, impact investing

JEL Classification: D21, G32, M41, Q51, Q54

Suggested Citation

Laux, Volker and Mahieux, Lucas, Exploiting Social Funds’ Desire for Impact through Imprecise Financial Climate-Risk Information (September 03, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4790574 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4790574

Volker Laux (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin ( email )

2317 Speedway
Austin, TX Texas 78712
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Lucas Mahieux

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
106
Abstract Views
473
Rank
553,385
PlumX Metrics