Taxes and Venture Capital Support

38 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 2004

See all articles by Christian Keuschnigg

Christian Keuschnigg

University of St. Gallen – Department of Economics (FGN-HSG); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Soren Bo Nielsen

Copenhagen Business School - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: December 2003

Abstract

In this paper we set up a model of start-up finance under double moral hazard. Entrepreneurs lack own resources and business experience to develop their ideas. Venture capitalists can provide start-up finance and commercial support. The effort put forth by either agent contributes to the firm's success, but is not verifiable. As a result, the market equilibrium is biased towards inefficiently low venture capital support. The capital gains tax becomes especially harmful, as it further impairs advice and causes a first-order welfare loss. Once the capital gains tax is in place, limitations on loss offset may paradoxically contribute to higher quality of venture capital finance and welfare. Subsidies to physical investment in VC-backed startups are detrimental in our framework.

Keywords: venture capital, capital gains taxation, double moral hazard.

JEL Classification: D82, G24, H24, H25

Suggested Citation

Keuschnigg, Christian and Nielsen, Soren Bo, Taxes and Venture Capital Support (December 2003). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1094. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=479481

Christian Keuschnigg

University of St. Gallen – Department of Economics (FGN-HSG) ( email )

Varnbuelstrasse 19
St. Gallen, 9000
Switzerland

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Soren Bo Nielsen (Contact Author)

Copenhagen Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

Porcelænshaven 16 A, 1
Frederiksberg C, DK-2000
Denmark

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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