Costs of Sovereign Debt Crises: Restructuring Strategies and Bank Intermediation *

27 Pages Posted: 24 Apr 2024

See all articles by Tamon Asonuma

Tamon Asonuma

International Monetary Fund (IMF) Strategy Policy and Review Department

Marcos Chamon

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department

Aitor Erce

UPNA

Akira Sasahara

Keio University

Date Written: April 14, 2024

Abstract

Sovereign debt restructurings are associated with declines in the growth of GDP, investment, bank credit to the private sector and capital flows. Our empirical findings show that the intensity of these losses depends on two aspects: whether the restructuring preempts a default and the extent of the reliance of the country's private sector on domestic bank credit. Post-default restructurings are associated with worse outcomes than restructurings that take place preemptively without missing payments and going into default. Much of that difference is driven by restructurings in countries with relatively large banking sectors, in particular during post-default episodes.

Keywords: F34, F41, H63)

JEL Classification: F34; F41; H63;

Suggested Citation

Asonuma, Tamon and Chamon, Marcos and Erce, Aitor and Sasahara, Akira, Costs of Sovereign Debt Crises: Restructuring Strategies and Bank Intermediation * (April 14, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4795074 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4795074

Tamon Asonuma

International Monetary Fund (IMF) Strategy Policy and Review Department ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Marcos Chamon (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
202-623-5867 (Phone)

Aitor Erce

UPNA ( email )

Pamplona
Spain

Akira Sasahara

Keio University ( email )

2-15-45 Mita
Minato-ku
Tokyo, 108-8345
Japan

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