Unraveling the Paradox of Anticorruption Messaging: Experimental Evidence from a Tax Administration Reform

Abstract

Corruption and its perception pose significant obstacles to development, as they undermine government capabilities, notably through reduced willingness to pay taxes among citizens. Research shows that prior beliefs systematically bias how individuals process information, which means efforts to combat corruption and improve public perceptions face a critical challenge: citizens with entrenched pessimistic beliefs about widespread corruption often resist change, reinforcing their preconceptions. We propose that providing an external benchmark of corruption to shift the reference point before delivering anticorruption messages can mitigate these backfiring effects. In a survey experiment exploiting an institutional reform to address corruption within Honduras’s tax agency, we find that while corruption-focused messages often backfire, our sequential approach reduces perceived corruption and lowers tax evasion intentions. A government-led field experiment with over 30,000 taxpayers validates these results: targeted anticorruption messages increased tax compliance. Our findings highlight the importance of addressing pre-existing beliefs in designing effective anti-corruption campaigns.

Keywords: Corruption, Tax Administration, Tax Evasion, Survey Experiment.

JEL Classification: C90, D90, H26, K42