Unraveling the Paradox of Anticorruption Messaging: Experimental Evidence from a Tax Administration Reform

58 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2024 Last revised: 15 Jan 2025

See all articles by Nicolas Ajzenman

Nicolas Ajzenman

McGill University - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Martin Ardanaz

Inter-American Development Bank

Guillermo Cruces

Universidad Nacional de La Plata (UNLP) - Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales (CEDLAS); IZA

German Feierherd

UdeSA

Ignacio Lunghi

Universidad Nacional de La Plata (UNLP) - Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales (CEDLAS)

Date Written: January 14, 2025

Abstract

Corruption and its perception pose significant obstacles to development, as they undermine government capabilities, notably through reduced willingness to pay taxes among citizens. Research shows that prior beliefs systematically bias how individuals process information, which means efforts to combat corruption and improve public perceptions face a critical challenge: citizens with entrenched pessimistic beliefs about widespread corruption often resist change, reinforcing their preconceptions. We propose that providing an external benchmark of corruption to shift the reference point before delivering anticorruption messages can mitigate these backfiring effects. In a survey experiment exploiting an institutional reform to address corruption within Honduras’s tax agency, we find that while corruption-focused messages often backfire, our sequential approach reduces perceived corruption and lowers tax evasion intentions. A government-led field experiment with over 30,000 taxpayers validates these results: targeted anticorruption messages increased tax compliance. Our findings highlight the importance of addressing pre-existing beliefs in designing effective anti-corruption campaigns.

Keywords: Corruption, Tax Administration, Tax Evasion, Survey Experiment.

JEL Classification: C90, D90, H26, K42

Suggested Citation

Ajzenman, Nicolás and Ardanaz, Martin and Cruces, Guillermo and Feierherd, German and Lunghi, Ignacio, Unraveling the Paradox of Anticorruption Messaging: Experimental Evidence from a Tax Administration Reform (January 14, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4795363 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4795363

Nicolás Ajzenman (Contact Author)

McGill University - Department of Economics ( email )

855 Sherbrooke Street West
Montreal, QC H3A 2T7
CANADA

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Martin Ardanaz

Inter-American Development Bank ( email )

Guillermo Cruces

Universidad Nacional de La Plata (UNLP) - Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales (CEDLAS) ( email )

Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y
Sociales, Calle 6 e/47 y 48
La Plata, Provincia de Buenos Aires 1900
Argentina

HOME PAGE: http://cedlas.econo.unlp.edu.ar

IZA

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

German Feierherd

UdeSA ( email )

Vito Dumas 284
Victoria, Buenos Aires 1644
Argentina

Ignacio Lunghi

Universidad Nacional de La Plata (UNLP) - Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales (CEDLAS) ( email )

Calle 6 e/47 y 48
La Plata, Provincia de Buenos Aires 1900
Argentina

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