Inventor Returns and Mobility

47 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2024

See all articles by Dietmar Harhoff

Dietmar Harhoff

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition; Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

David Heller

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Paul P. Momtaz

Technische Universität München (TUM) - TUM School of Management; University College London Center for Blockchain Technologies; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: April 16, 2024

Abstract

We show that firm and industry, rather than inventor and invention factors, explain more than half of the variation in inventor returns in administrative employer-inventor-patent linked data from Germany. Between-firm variation in inventive rents is strongly associated with inventor mobility. Inventors are more likely to make a move just before a patent is filed than shortly thereafter and benefit from their move through a mobility-related marginal inventor return. Employers that pay inventor returns in excess of the expected return gain a favorable position in the market for inventive labor with subsequent increases in patent quality and quantity. Consistent with theoretical arguments, these results are sensitive to employers' technological complementarity and degree of competition, and invention quality.

Keywords: Inventor returns, labor mobility, patents, inventive productivity

JEL Classification: O31, J24, J62

Suggested Citation

Harhoff, Dietmar and Heller, David and Momtaz, Paul P., Inventor Returns and Mobility (April 16, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4795980 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4795980

Dietmar Harhoff

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany
+49 89 24246 550 (Phone)
+49 89 24246 599 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ip.mpg.de

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München ( email )

Munich, 80539
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

David Heller (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.david-heller.com

Paul P. Momtaz

Technische Universität München (TUM) - TUM School of Management ( email )

Arcisstr. 21
Munich, 80333
Germany

University College London Center for Blockchain Technologies ( email )

UCL CBT UCL Computer Science
Malet Place London WC
London, London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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