Minimal Stable Voting Rules

20 Pages Posted: 19 Apr 2024

See all articles by Hector Hermida-Rivera

Hector Hermida-Rivera

Budapest University of Technology and Economics

Date Written: April 16, 2024

Abstract

In this paper, I characterise minimal stable voting rules and minimal self-stable constitutions (i.e., pairs of voting rules) for societies in which only power matters. To do so, I first let voters’ preferences over voting rules satisfy four natural axioms commonly used in the analysis of power: non-dominance, anonymity, null voter and swing voter. I then provide simple notions of minimal stability and minimal self-stability, and show that the families of minimal stable voting rules and minimal self-stable constitutions are fairly small. Finally, I conclude that political parties are often key to the minimal self-stability of otherwise not minimal self-stable constitutions.

Keywords: voting rules, constitutions, minimal, stability, self-stability, power

JEL Classification: D71, D72

Suggested Citation

Hermida-Rivera, Hector, Minimal Stable Voting Rules (April 16, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4800588 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4800588

Hector Hermida-Rivera (Contact Author)

Budapest University of Technology and Economics ( email )

Magyar tudósok körútja 2
Budapest, 1117
Hungary

HOME PAGE: http://www.hectorhermidarivera.com

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