Institutional Change

Handbook of New Institutional Economics, 2024

GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 24-22

32 Pages Posted: 29 May 2024

See all articles by Desiree Desierto

Desiree Desierto

George Mason University - Department of Economics

Mark Koyama

George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Date Written: April 20, 2024

Abstract

How does institutional change take place? This question poses a number of challenges for scholars working in the New Institutional tradition. We first discuss how institutions have been conceptualized as either "rules of the game" or as "equilibria". The rules of the game perspective suggests that institutions perhaps useful functions and change when circumstances make these functions obsolete except when transaction costs render this change too costly. The institutions as equilibria perspective, in contrast suggests that both cooperation and conflict that drive institutional change and that institutional change need not be efficient. We propose a framework for simultaneously depicting institutional change driven by both cooperation and cooperative. Finally, we discuss the role individuals can play in shaping institutional change.

Keywords: Institutions, Institutional Change, Conflict, Cooperation, Efficiency

JEL Classification: N00, N13

Suggested Citation

Desierto, Desiree and Koyama, Mark, Institutional Change (April 20, 2024). Handbook of New Institutional Economics, 2024, GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 24-22, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4801975 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4801975

Desiree Desierto

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

Mark Koyama (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~mkoyama2/About.html

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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