Top Executives, Turnover and Firm Performance in Germany

24 Pages Posted: 8 Aug 2007 Last revised: 28 Jul 2010

See all articles by Steven N. Kaplan

Steven N. Kaplan

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); University of Chicago - Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship

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Date Written: August 1993

Abstract

This paper examines executive turnover -- both for management and supervisory boards - - and its relation to firm performance in the largest companies in Germany in the 1980s. The management board turns over slowly -- at a rate of 10% per year -- implying that top executives in Germany have longer tenures than their counterparts in the U.S. and Japan. Turnover of the management board increases significantly with stock performance and particularly poor (i.e. negative) earnings, but is unrelated to sales growth and earnings growth. Turnover of the supervisory board is not consistently related to any measure of performance.

Suggested Citation

Kaplan, Steven Neil, Top Executives, Turnover and Firm Performance in Germany (August 1993). NBER Working Paper No. w4416, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=480231

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