Information-Optional Policies and the Gender Concealment Gap

62 Pages Posted: 23 Apr 2024 Last revised: 22 Nov 2024

See all articles by Christine L Exley

Christine L Exley

Harvard University

Raymond J. Fisman

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Boston University

Judd B. Kessler

University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department

Louis Pierre Lepage

Stockholm University; Queen's University

Xiaomeng Li

University of Michigan, Department of Economics

Corinne Low

University of Pennsylvania

Xiaoyue Shan

National University of Singapore (NUS)

Mattie Toma

University of Warwick

Basit Zafar

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: April 2024

Abstract

We analyze data from two universities that allowed students to replace a letter grade with “credit” on their transcript. At both schools, we observe a significant and substantial gender concealment gap: women are less likely than men to conceal grades, particularly grades that would harm their GPA. This gender concealment gap produces differential GPA gains from the policy with men benefiting nearly 50% more than women. Additional complementary data, including surveys and experiments with students and employers, suggest why women may conceal less: women may expect observers to have more negative inferences about their concealed grades.

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Suggested Citation

Exley, Christine L and Fisman, Raymond and Kessler, Judd B. and Lepage, Louis Pierre and Li, Xiaomeng and Low, Corinne and Shan, Xiaoyue and Toma, Mattie and Zafar, Basit, Information-Optional Policies and the Gender Concealment Gap (April 2024). NBER Working Paper No. w32350, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4802564

Christine L Exley (Contact Author)

Harvard University ( email )

Raymond Fisman

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Boston University ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
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Judd B. Kessler

University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6372
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://bepp.wharton.upenn.edu/profile/1671/

Louis Pierre Lepage

Stockholm University ( email )

Universitetsvägen 10
Stockholm, Stockholm SE-106 91
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/lepagelp/

Queen's University ( email )

99 University Ave
Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/lepagelp/

Xiaomeng Li

University of Michigan, Department of Economics ( email )

735 S. State Street
Ann Arbor,, MI 48109

Corinne Low

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Xiaoyue Shan

National University of Singapore (NUS) ( email )

Mattie Toma

University of Warwick ( email )

Gibbet Hill Rd.
Coventry, CV4 8UW
United Kingdom

Basit Zafar

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor ( email )

500 S. State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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