The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy
41 Pages Posted: 27 Dec 2003
Abstract
This paper provides a compact account of the problem of distorted choice in corporate takeovers. (A more detailed account is provided in, "Towards Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers"). I analyze how the tender decisions of shareholders facing a takeover bid might be distorted. I also put forward an approach for addressing this problem, as well as analyze several alternative remedies.
Keywords: Takeovers, targets, pressure, tender offers, for tender anti-takeover arrangements, anti-takeover statues, minority shares, freeze outs, bid price, voting
JEL Classification: G30, G34, K22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Lucian A. Bebchuk (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
617-812-0554 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/
