The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy

Bebchuk, Lucian A.

The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy

Delaware Journal of Corporate Law (DJCL), Vol. 12, pp. 911-949, 1987

41 Pages Posted: 27 Dec 2003

See all articles by Lucian A. Bebchuk

Lucian A. Bebchuk

Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Abstract

This paper provides a compact account of the problem of distorted choice in corporate takeovers. (A more detailed account is provided in, "Towards Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers"). I analyze how the tender decisions of shareholders facing a takeover bid might be distorted. I also put forward an approach for addressing this problem, as well as analyze several alternative remedies.

Keywords: Takeovers, targets, pressure, tender offers, for tender anti-takeover arrangements, anti-takeover statues, minority shares, freeze outs, bid price, voting

JEL Classification: G30, G34, K22

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A., The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law (DJCL), Vol. 12, pp. 911-949, 1987. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=480301