The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy

41 Pages Posted: 27 Dec 2003

See all articles by Lucian A. Bebchuk

Lucian A. Bebchuk

Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Abstract

This paper provides a compact account of the problem of distorted choice in corporate takeovers. (A more detailed account is provided in, "Towards Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers"). I analyze how the tender decisions of shareholders facing a takeover bid might be distorted. I also put forward an approach for addressing this problem, as well as analyze several alternative remedies.

Keywords: Takeovers, targets, pressure, tender offers, for tender anti-takeover arrangements, anti-takeover statues, minority shares, freeze outs, bid price, voting

JEL Classification: G30, G34, K22

Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A., The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=480301

Lucian A. Bebchuk (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
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HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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