Government Procurement: Market Access, Transparency, and Multilateral Trade Rules
30 Pages Posted: 18 Dec 2003
There are 2 versions of this paper
Government Procurement: Market Access, Transparency, and Multilateral Trade Rules
Date Written: November 2003
Abstract
The effects on national welfare and on market access of two public procurement practices, discrimination and non-transparency, are examined. Both policies have become prominent in international trade negotiations, such as the ongoing Doha Round of WTO trade talks. Our analysis shows that fostering either domestic competition or transparency in state contracting tends to improve welfare. In contrast, we find no clear-cut effect on market access of ending discrimination or improving transparency. This mismatch between market access and welfare effects may account for the slower progress in negotiating procurement disciplines in trade agreements than for traditional border measures such as tariffs.
JEL Classification: F13, H57
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Simon J. Evenett (Contact Author)
University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )
Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
44 1865 288 875 (Phone)
44 1865 288 805 (Fax)
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