A Note on Optimal Law Enforcement with Legal Aid

13 Pages Posted: 6 Jan 2004

See all articles by Nuno Garoupa

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Frank Stephen

School of Law, University of Manchester

Date Written: November 2003

Abstract

The economic literature on enforcement is generally pessimistic concerning the use of legal aid. In this Paper, we show that legal aid can be part of optimal law enforcement. The rationale behind our result is that with legal aid, in a system with legal or judicial error, both guilty and innocent individuals are better off because the marginal cost of defense expenditure is reduced. If, on average, legal aid helps the innocent more than the guilty a government seeking to maximize social welfare will want to use it in order to increase deterrence.

Keywords: Sanction, self-reporting, legal aid

JEL Classification: K40

Suggested Citation

Garoupa, Nuno and Stephen, Frank H., A Note on Optimal Law Enforcement with Legal Aid (November 2003). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4113. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=480382

Nuno Garoupa (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Frank H. Stephen

School of Law, University of Manchester ( email )

Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL, M139PL
Great Britain

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
19
Abstract Views
1,245
PlumX Metrics
!

Under construction: SSRN citations while be offline until July when we will launch a brand new and improved citations service, check here for more details.

For more information