Firm Inflexibility and Corporate Tax Avoidance

62 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2024

See all articles by Wesley Deng

Wesley Deng

University of New South Wales - UNSW Business School

Fariz Huseynov

North Dakota State University - College of Business

Sabuhi Sardarli

Kansas State University - Department of Finance

Chao Zhou

University of Tasmania - School of Economics and Finance

Date Written: April 23, 2024

Abstract

We examine the relationship between operational inflexibility and corporate tax avoidance behavior, focusing on the potential for tax avoidance as a means of preparing for operational shocks. Our analysis reveals a strong positive association between inflexibility and tax avoidance – one standard deviation increase in a firm's inflexibility is linked to a 4.1% decrease in cash effective tax rate. We further show that this relationship is likely causal using an exogenous regulatory credit supply shock. Moreover, we find that this relationship is primarily driven by tax base avoidance (as opposed to tax rate avoidance), and is stronger for firms with volatile cash flows, greater financial constraints, higher institutional ownership, more independent boards, and higher CEO risk-taking. The findings suggest that tax avoidance can create value for firms facing operational challenges, particularly for those with stronger governance mechanisms.

Keywords: Firm Inflexibility, Financial Flexibility, Corporate Tax Avoidance, Banking Deregulation, Value Creation

JEL Classification: g32, h26

Suggested Citation

Deng, Xiaohu and Huseynov, Fariz and Sardarli, Sabuhi and Zhou, Chao, Firm Inflexibility and Corporate Tax Avoidance (April 23, 2024). UNSW Business School Research Paper Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4803896 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4803896

Xiaohu Deng (Contact Author)

University of New South Wales - UNSW Business School ( email )

Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://wesleydeng.net

Fariz Huseynov

North Dakota State University - College of Business ( email )

Department of Acctg, Finance & Information Systems
Fargo, ND 58108
United States
+17012315074 (Phone)

Sabuhi Sardarli

Kansas State University - Department of Finance ( email )

Manhattan, KS 66506
United States

Chao Zhou

University of Tasmania - School of Economics and Finance ( email )

Commerce Building,
Sandy Bay Campus
Sandy Bay, TAS, Tasmania 7005
Australia

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