A Strategic Interpretation of Legal Transplants

31 Pages Posted: 17 Dec 2003

See all articles by Nuno Garoupa

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School

Anthony Ogus

The University of Manchester - School of Law; Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2003

Abstract

In this Paper, we provide a strategic explanation for the spontaneous convergence of legal rules, which nevertheless falls short of harmonization across jurisdictions. We identify a free-riding problem and discuss its implications for legal culture, integration, and harmonization. It is argued that harmonization of legal rules by a central authority in order to generate a uniform legal culture could be the response to a coordination failure. It could also be a serious policy mistake, however, leaving everybody worse off. The result depends crucially on the relative benefits and costs of importing and integrating different legal orders.

Keywords: Legal transplant, game theory, harmonization

JEL Classification: C70, K00

Suggested Citation

Garoupa, Nuno and Ogus, Anthony I., A Strategic Interpretation of Legal Transplants (November 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=480744

Nuno Garoupa (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Anthony I. Ogus

The University of Manchester - School of Law ( email )

Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.manchester.ac.uk/aboutus/staff/anthony_ogus/default.html

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law ( email )

3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
+31 -10-408-1585 (Phone)

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