A Strategic Interpretation of Legal Transplants

Garoupa, Nuno; Ogus, Anthony

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A Strategic Interpretation of Legal Transplants

31 Pages Posted: 17 Dec 2003

See all articles by Nuno Garoupa

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School

Anthony Ogus

The University of Manchester - School of Law; Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law

There are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2003

Abstract

In this Paper, we provide a strategic explanation for the spontaneous convergence of legal rules, which nevertheless falls short of harmonization across jurisdictions. We identify a free-riding problem and discuss its implications for legal culture, integration, and harmonization. It is argued that harmonization of legal rules by a central authority in order to generate a uniform legal culture could be the response to a coordination failure. It could also be a serious policy mistake, however, leaving everybody worse off. The result depends crucially on the relative benefits and costs of importing and integrating different legal orders.

Keywords: Legal transplant, game theory, harmonization

JEL Classification: C70, K00

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Garoupa, Nuno and Ogus, Anthony I., A Strategic Interpretation of Legal Transplants (November 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=480744