Economic Analysis in Antitrust Litigation: Empirical Evidence from the Courts, 1890-2018

43 Pages Posted: 30 Apr 2024 Last revised: 2 Jul 2024

See all articles by Federico Ciliberto

Federico Ciliberto

University of Virginia - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); DIW Econ GmbH

Kenneth G. Elzinga

University of Virginia - Department of Economics

D. Daniel Sokol

USC Gould School of Law; USC Marshall School of Business

Date Written: April 27, 2024

Abstract

This study investigates the evolution of economic analysis in antitrust litigation using an original dataset encompassing all decided antitrust cases since the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890. Our analysis reveals three distinct breaks in the frequency of economists mentioned in antitrust cases: 1974, 1994, and 2007. Furthermore, we observe substantial fluctuations in the success rates of plaintiffs across various stages of litigation. Additionally, the study finds that the underlying statutory basis of cases involving economists has shifted over time, with a notable increase in Sherman Act cases and a corresponding decrease in Clayton Act and combined Clayton-Sherman Act cases.

Keywords: Antitrust litigation, Expert Testimony, Sherman Act.

JEL Classification: A11, K41, L40.

Suggested Citation

Ciliberto, Federico and Elzinga, Kenneth G. and Sokol, D. Daniel, Economic Analysis in Antitrust Litigation: Empirical Evidence from the Courts, 1890-2018 (April 27, 2024). USC CLASS Research Paper No. 24-22, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4809691 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4809691

Federico Ciliberto (Contact Author)

University of Virginia - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 400182
Charlottesville, VA 22904-4182
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

DIW Econ GmbH ( email )

Mohrenstraße 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany

Kenneth G. Elzinga

University of Virginia - Department of Economics ( email )

PO Box 400182
Charlottesville, VA 22904-4182
United States

D. Daniel Sokol

USC Gould School of Law ( email )

699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

USC Marshall School of Business ( email )

701 Exposition Blvd
Los Angeles, CA California 90089
United States

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