The Provision of Information and Incentives in School Assignment Mechanisms

24 Pages Posted: 1 May 2024

See all articles by Derek Neal

Derek Neal

University of Chicago

Joseph Root

University of Chicago

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 30, 2024

Abstract

Research on centralized school assignment mechanisms often focuses on whether parents who participate in specific mechanisms are likely to truthfully report their preferences or engage in various costly strategic behaviors. However, a growing literature suggests that parents may not know enough about the school options available to them to form complete preference rankings. We develop a simple model that explains why it is not surprising that many participants in school assignment mechanisms possess limited information about the schools available to them. We then discuss policies that could improve both the information that participants bring to school assignment mechanisms and the quality of the schools in their choice sets.

JEL Classification: I20,I28

Suggested Citation

Neal, Derek and Root, Joseph, The Provision of Information and Incentives in School Assignment Mechanisms (April 30, 2024). University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2024-55, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4812938 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4812938

Derek Neal (Contact Author)

University of Chicago ( email )

Joseph Root

University of Chicago ( email )

1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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