Vice Capital

Abstract

Academic and market interest in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) investing has grown markedly in recent years. Although less prominent, a substantial literature also explores whether “sin pays” in the public capital markets. This literature’s underlying theory is that social norms discourage the funding of businesses that promote vice and that some investors, particularly institutions sensitive to social norms, such as pension funds and foundations, will shun such investments. A consequence of this vice aversion is a “vice premium” for those investors who will invest in such companies. Largely unexplored, however, is what industries or business models qualify as “vice,” how this definition is constructed and changes, how vice aversion affects startup corporate governance and finance, and what consequences vice aversion holds for the real economy.

We address these gaps through a series of interviews with startup founders, venture-capital (VC) and angel investors, and legal and financial practitioners. Descriptive data from commercial VC databases supplement our interviews. We find that the definition of “vice” is nuanced and shifts over time as the subjective preferences of investors and their constituents adapt to changing regulatory environments and social mores. We further find that compared to non-vice startups, vice startups face heightened regulatory and business-infrastructure hurdles. The findings hold especially for women and other minoritized vice entrepreneurs and those serving minoritized customer bases. These challenges implicate entrepreneurship, society, and capital markets, including by complicating the concept of the vice premium in finance theory and by showing the potential for vice aversion to shape both the vice and non-vice sides of the real economy.

Keywords: ESG, venture capital, sin stocks, sin industries, entrepreneurship, vice capital, corporate governance, minority entrepreneurs

JEL Classification: G11, G24, G34, M13, M14, K12, K22, L21, L26