Does Performance Pressure Accentuate Outcome Bias? Evidence from Managerial Dismissals

36 Pages Posted: 7 May 2024

See all articles by Fabienne Jedelhauser

Fabienne Jedelhauser

University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW)

Raphael Flepp

University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW)

Pascal Flurin Meier

University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW)

Egon P. Franck

University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW)

Date Written: May 6, 2024

Abstract

Outcome bias refers to the tendency to overweight the informativeness of observed outcomes in evaluations, consequently underestimating the influence of luck. However, observed outcomes that fall short of expectations simultaneously trigger performance pressure, potentially reinforcing outcome bias in evaluation decisions such as managerial dismissals. Using data from European football, we investigate whether managerial dismissal decisions are influenced by luck operationalized as opponent player injuries and whether this influence is more pronounced under performance pressure. Our findings reveal that luck significantly impacts dismissal decisions, particularly as performance pressure mounts. Importantly, this amplified outcome bias under performance pressure is predominantly driven by instances of bad luck. These results suggest that the extent of outcome bias has been underappreciated, especially in situations involving bad luck.

Keywords: Outcome Bias, Luck, Performance Pressure, Managerial Dismissal, Principal-Agent Setting

JEL Classification: D81, D86, D91, J44, Z2

Suggested Citation

Jedelhauser, Fabienne and Flepp, Raphael and Meier, Pascal Flurin and Franck, Egon P., Does Performance Pressure Accentuate Outcome Bias? Evidence from Managerial Dismissals (May 6, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4818161 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4818161

Fabienne Jedelhauser (Contact Author)

University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW) ( email )

Plattenstrasse 14
Zurich, 8032
Switzerland

Raphael Flepp

University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW) ( email )

Plattenstrasse 14
Zurich, 8032
Switzerland

Pascal Flurin Meier

University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW) ( email )

Plattenstrasse 14
Zurich, 8032
Switzerland

Egon P. Franck

University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW) ( email )

Plattenstrasse 14
Zurich 8032
Switzerland
+41 1 634 28 45 (Phone)

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