Rewriting Precedent: How International Adjudicators Influence Compliance

Abstract

International cooperation depends on adaptation to changing conditions. International dispute settlement bodies can play a key role in keeping cooperation overtime. Evidence suggests that when legal bodies successfully adapt the law through the reinterpretation of rules, they can promote state compliance. However, this process is incremental and may not happen quickly enough, which can lead to backlash against international courts. In this article, we analyze these dynamics at the World Trade Organization (WTO), the global institution regulating international trade. Relying on data and case studies we show how the Appellate Body modified their interpretations to promote compliance. Because this cannot happen in every dispute, the WTO illustrates the tensions between consistency and adaptation faced by legal institutions.

Keywords: World Trade Organization, WTO, international trade law, precedent, Appellate Body, international courts and tribunals, international law, compliance, adaptation, empirical legal studies