Restoring Unanimity: The Role of Attention Allocation in Committee Decision-Making

Abstract

The unanimity rule is considered inferior at aggregating information in committee decision-making to the simple majority rule (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1998), which exhibits less institutional bias toward one outcome over another. In this paper, we argue that institutional bias can, paradoxically, lead to better decision-making when it causes committee members to adapt their attention in a way that counteracts the potential errors caused by the bias itself. Specifically, we develop a common-value model where committee members flexibly allocate their attention before a collective decision between two options. As a result of the flexibility in attention allocation, we show that the unanimity rule can outperform simple majority rule in ensuring correct committee decisions. This occurs because, as the voting rule shifts to favor one outcome over another, it directs committee members' attention towards the aspects of possible errors more likely caused by the institutional bias. The adjustment of attention can mitigate the downside of the more biased rule, thereby resulting in a better collective choice. Our analysis suggests that committee members' attention, as a limited resource, can be properly mobilized to compensate for the limitations of the institution and achieve the collective goal.

Keywords: unanimity rule, committee decision, flexible attention allocation, jury trial

JEL Classification: D7, D8