Strategic Data Sales with Partial Segment Profiling

50 Pages Posted: 9 May 2024

See all articles by Flavio Delbono

Flavio Delbono

University of Bologna - School of Economics, Management, and Statistics

Carlo Reggiani

The University of Manchester

Luca Sandrini

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research; Budapest University of Technology and Economics

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Abstract

We analyze the incentives of a data broker to sell consumer level data that enable personalized pricing to competing firms, when only a fraction of consumers is profiled. One firm has more potential consumers profiled, and can benefit the most from the data. We show that the data broker may decide not to sell the dataset to the firm that would benefit the most of it, and instead trade with its competitors. In particular, we identify a strategic reaction effect on competitors that want to prevent that data increase competition.

Keywords: data markets, personalised pricing, price discrimination, oligopoly, selling mechanisms

Suggested Citation

Delbono, Flavio and Reggiani, Carlo and Sandrini, Luca, Strategic Data Sales with Partial Segment Profiling. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4822130 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4822130

Flavio Delbono

University of Bologna - School of Economics, Management, and Statistics ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy

Carlo Reggiani

The University of Manchester ( email )

Oxford Road
Manchester, N/A M13 9PL
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/carloreggianieconomics/home

Luca Sandrini (Contact Author)

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Budapest University of Technology and Economics ( email )

Budafoki ut 8.
Budapest, 1111
Hungary

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