Minority Representation at Work

109 Pages Posted: 9 May 2024

See all articles by Matthias Breuer

Matthias Breuer

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Accounting, Business Law & Taxation

Wei Cai

Columbia Business School

Anthony Le

Columbia University

Felix Vetter

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Date Written: May 9, 2024

Abstract

Recent proposals for a more inclusive capitalism call for labor and minority representation in corporate governance. We examine the joint promise of labor and minority representation in the context of German works councils. The councils are a powerful form of labor representation that grants elected delegates of shop-floor workers codetermination rights (e.g., over work conditions). Since 2001, a quota ensures that elected delegates include delegates of the minority gender in the workforce. Using detailed survey and administrative data, we find that required minority representation helps the representation of the minority gender on works councils, elevates the effort of works councils, and boosts job satisfaction and well-being of workers, irrespective of their gender. At the establishment level, we find that required minority representation reduces worker turnover and increases investment and productivity. Our findings suggest that laws ensuring labor and minority representation in corporate governance can work (i.e., benefit workers without necessarily hurting employers). The seemingly beneficial impact of the laws suggests that frictions hamper the representation of minorities and cooperation among workers and employers.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Labor Representation, Gender Quota, Job Satisfaction

JEL Classification: J15, J16, J28, J53, J54, J63, J71, J81, J82, J83, K22, K31, M12, M14, M50, M54, P16

Suggested Citation

Breuer, Matthias and Cai, Wei and Le, Anthony and Vetter, Felix, Minority Representation at Work (May 9, 2024). George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy & the State Working Paper No. 343, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4822580 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4822580

Matthias Breuer (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Accounting, Business Law & Taxation ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Wei Cai

Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Anthony Le

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Felix Vetter

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

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