Taxes Depress Corporate Borrowing: Evidence from Private Firms

77 Pages Posted: 14 May 2024 Last revised: 9 Jan 2025

See all articles by Ivan Ivanov

Ivan Ivanov

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Luke Pettit

US Senate

Toni M. Whited

University of Michigan, Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2024

Abstract

We use variation in state corporate income tax rates to re-examine the relation between taxes and corporate leverage. Contrary to prior research, we find that corporate leverage rises after tax cuts for small private firms. An estimated dynamic equilibrium model shows that tax cuts make capital more productive and spur borrowing. Tax cuts also produce more distant default thresholds and lower credit spreads. These effects outweigh the lower interest tax deduction and lead to higher optimal leverage choices, especially for firms with flexible investment policies. The presence of the interest tax deduction raises consumer welfare in equilibrium.

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Suggested Citation

Ivanov, Ivan and Pettit, Luke and Whited, Toni M., Taxes Depress Corporate Borrowing: Evidence from Private Firms (May 2024). NBER Working Paper No. w32398, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4825983

Ivan Ivanov (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago ( email )

230 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, IL 60604
United States

HOME PAGE: http://ivantivanov.com

Luke Pettit

US Senate

U.S. Senate
Washington, DC 20510
United States

Toni M. Whited

University of Michigan, Department of Economics ( email )

735 S. State Street
Ann Arbor,, MI 48109

National Bureau of Economic Research ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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